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Ivan Katchanovski

# The OUN, the UPA, and the Nazi Genocide in Ukraine

## OUN and UPA Controversies

The political rehabilitation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins'kykh Natsionalistiv – OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrayinska Povstans'ka Armiya – UPA) became one of the central political issues in post-Soviet Ukraine, especially after the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Euromaidan in 2014.<sup>1</sup> Petro Poroshenko during his presidency after the Euromaidan and Viktor Yushchenko's during his presidency 2005 to 2010, along with the ruling and far right parties, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, and most of mass media outlets, pursued the complete political rehabilitation of the OUN and the UPA. They portrayed these organizations as a mass national liberation movement that fought against both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union for Ukrainian independence, and they presented the leaders of the OUN and the UPA as national heroes.

In 2018, Petro Poroshenko made the *Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!* greeting of the Stepan Bandera faction of the OUN the official greeting of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Ukrainian police. The Ukrainian parliament declared in 2018 all OUN and UPA members as war veterans who are eligible for government benefits. The new law eliminated previous exclusion of members of these far right organizations who commit-

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1 Ivan Katchanovski, Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics and Perceptions of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine, in: Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48 (2015) 2-3, 217-228; Ivan Katchanovski, The Politics of World War II in Contemporary Ukraine, in: Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27 (2014) 2, 210-233; David R. Marples, Heroes and Villains. Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine, Budapest 2007; Orhanizatsia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv i Ukrainska povstanska armii. Fakhovyi vysnovok robochoi grupy istorykiv pry Uriadovii komisii z vyvchennia diialnosti OUN i UPA [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Expert conclusion of a working group of historians under the government commission for study of OUN and UPA activity], Kyiv 2005; Oxana Shevel, The Politics of Memory in a Divided Society. A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine, in: Slavic Review 70 (2011) 1, 137-164.

ted crimes and were not rehabilitated because of their participation in the Nazi-led genocide, the ethnic cleansing of Poles, and other mass killings. Another law, which was adopted by the parliament in 2015, declared the OUN and the UPA members as fighters for Ukrainian independence and stipulated that Ukrainians and foreigners are subject to prosecution for showing public disrespect towards members of these organizations. Such policies concerning the OUN and the UPA were condemned by the governments of Israel, Poland, and Russia.

In 2007, President Yushchenko awarded the *Hero of Ukraine* title posthumously to Roman Shukhevych, the Supreme Commander of the UPA, and in 2010 to Stepan Bandera, the leader of the main faction of the OUN (OUN-B). The leaders of Poland and Russia, the European Parliament, and the Simon Wiesenthal Center in the United States publicly condemned Yushchenko's awarding of the title of *Hero of Ukraine* to Stepan Bandera by pointing out OUN's collaboration with Nazi Germany and OUN's involvement in mass murder.<sup>2</sup> After Victor Yanukovich became president of Ukraine, the courts annulled Yushchenko's presidential decrees awarding the *Hero of Ukraine* titles to Bandera and Shukhevych, but UPA and OUN leaders were commemorated during the Yanukovich presidency at the local level in Western Ukraine, especially Galicia and Volhynia. Svoboda, a radical nationalist party that regards itself as an ideological successor of the OUN, won local elections in 2010 in Galicia and received 10.5 percent of the votes in the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine.

Radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations, which regarded themselves to various degrees as ideological successors of the OUN and the UPA, played a key role in toppling the Yanukovich government by force. They participated in attempts to storm the presidential administration on December 1, 2013 and the Ukrainian parliament on January 19, 2014 and February 18, 2014 and in seizures of regional and Kyiv City administrations and police and SBU regional headquarters, primarily in Western Ukraine. Various evidence indicates involvement of far right organizations, such as the Right Sector and Svoboda, in the massacre of the Maidan protesters and the police. These organizations used OUN-B symbols, such as the red and black flag, while the OUN-B greeting *Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!* was widely used not only by the far right but also by the mainstream Maidan parties and politicians.<sup>3</sup>

2 European Parliament resolution of February 25, 2010 on the situation in Ukraine, [https://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/j4nvgs5kjg27kof\\_j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vidm7vhoz0yn/f=/7469\\_10.pdf](https://www.eumonitor.nl/9353000/1/j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j9vvik7m1c3gyxp/vidm7vhoz0yn/f=/7469_10.pdf) (January 26, 2019); Wiesenthal Center Blasts Ukrainian Honor for Nazi Collaborator, <http://www.wiesenthal.com> (January 26, 2019).

3 Ivan Katchanovski, *The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: A Summary of Analysis, Evidence, and Findings*, in: J.L. Black and Michael Johns (ed.), *The Return of the Cold War: Ukraine, the West and Russia*, Abingdon (VI) 2016, 220-224; Ivan Katchanovski, *The "Snipers' Massacre" on the Maidan in Ukraine*, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco 2015, [https://www.academia.edu/8776021/The\\_Snipers\\_Massacre\\_on\\_the\\_Maidan\\_in\\_Ukraine](https://www.academia.edu/8776021/The_Snipers_Massacre_on_the_Maidan_in_Ukraine) (February 24, 2019); Ivan Katchanovski, *The Far Right in Ukraine During the "Euromaidan" and the War in Don-*

Svoboda members received several ministerial positions in the first post-Maidan government. The far right organizations, such as the Right Sector, also played a key role in the start and escalation of the civil war in Donbas. They organized and led special police battalions, the Azov regiment, and militia formations and took active part in the war in Donbas.<sup>4</sup>

However, polls before the Euromaidan showed that the OUN, the UPA, and their respective leaders Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych were only popular among the majority of Svoboda voters and among residents in Galicia. Positive attitude towards them were in the minority among voters of all other major parties, all generations and residents of other regions, including Kyiv. Only one percent of Ukrainians in 2012 preferred German Army during the Second World War.<sup>5</sup>

The political controversy concerning the OUN and the UPA raises a question concerning their role in the Nazi genocide during the Second World War. The charges of the collaboration by the OUN and the UPA with Nazi Germany and their involvement in the Nazi-led mass murders have been dismissed by the proponents of the political rehabilitation and glorification of these organizations. They argued that these charges were unfounded since they relied primarily on evidence provided by the Soviet authorities, in particular, the KGB – the Committee for State Security – with the aim to discredit the OUN and the UPA in both Ukraine and abroad during the Cold War. For example, President Yushchenko stated that the UPA, in particular its commander, Roman **Shukhevych**, did not conduct any anti-Jewish actions. The president maintained that, on the contrary, the UPA lost 6,000 members fighting the German forces, and that the UPA included many Jews and saved many Jews during the war.<sup>6</sup> The Maidan governments, in particular, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory headed by Volodymyr **Viatrovykh**, conducted similar policy of rehabilitation of the OUN and the UPA and denial or omission of their collaboration and involvement in the Nazi genocide.

The nationalist politicians and many historians in Ukraine argued that the OUN-B was forced to collaborate with Nazi Germany not for ideological reasons, but because

bas. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia 2016, [https://www.academia.edu/28203585/The\\_Far\\_Right\\_in\\_Ukraine\\_During\\_the\\_Euromaidan\\_and\\_the\\_War\\_in\\_Donbas](https://www.academia.edu/28203585/The_Far_Right_in_Ukraine_During_the_Euromaidan_and_the_War_in_Donbas) (February 24, 2019); Ivan Katchanovski, *The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: Revelations from Trials and Investigations*, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston 2018, <https://apsa2018-apsa.ipostersessions.com/default.aspx?s=BE-A7-7C-A2-1B-56-0C-9E-48-D5-D8-80-27-5D-F6-17> (February 24, 2019).

4 Ivan Katchanovski, *The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?*, in: *European Politics and Society* 17 (2016) 4, 473-489; Katchanovski, *The Far Right*; Katchanovski, *Politics of World War II: Katchanovski, Terrorists or National Heroes*.

5 Katchanovski, *Politics of World War II*; Katchanovski, *Terrorists or National Heroes*.

6 Yushchenko ob antisemitakh v rukovodstve Ukrainy: "Takikh liudei net" (Interview) [Yushchenko concerning antisemites in the leadership of Ukraine: "There are no such people" (Interview)], in: *Newsru*, November 15, 2007, [http://www.newsru.co.il/israel/15nov2007/yushenko\\_int\\_106.html](http://www.newsru.co.il/israel/15nov2007/yushenko_int_106.html) (9 November 2018).

it was in interest of the pro-independence struggle and that this collaboration effectively ended after the Nazi leadership refused to accept a declaration of a Ukrainian state by OUN-B leaders in Lviv on June 30, 1941. These politicians and historians emphasized that many OUN-B leaders and ordinary members, including Bandera, were arrested, imprisoned in concentration camps, or killed by the Germans. They presented the UPA as a guerrilla army, which included not only ethnic Ukrainians, but also a significant number of minorities, such as Jews and Azeris, and which fought primarily against Soviet and German police and military forces and Soviet and Polish partisans.<sup>7</sup>

This study examines the question as to whether leaders and members of the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in the Nazi-led genocide of Jews, Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians in Ukraine. The study analyzes the biographies of OUN-B and UPA leaders. A specific focus is on Volhynia (contemporary Volyn and Rivne Oblasts and the north-western part of Ternopil Oblast), where the UPA was founded by the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the spring of 1943. The study deals primarily with the OUN-B because it was historically more influential than the Andrii Melnyk faction (OUN-M), particularly in that it organized the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and because it was the OUN faction primarily referenced in the glorification rhetoric regarding the OUN in 'Orange' and 'Maidan' Ukraine. Furthermore, the study analyzes the biographies of 119 top-ranked and 210 middle-ranked OUN-B leaders and UPA commanders in Ukraine who were included in the two volumes of a book by Petro Sodol.<sup>8</sup> This book contains the most comprehensive and systematic biographic sample of OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine during the Second World War and several years after the war. It was published by OUN-run *Proloh* in the US. They include the absolute majority of OUN and UPA leadership in Ukraine during the war and at least a large proportion of middle-level leaders. The complete universe of such leaders and commanders is not available because of lack of data. Because data about their real names, activities, and fates, in many instances, especially in cases of mid-level leaders, are incomplete or uncertain, biographical information from other sources, such as Litopys UPA, memoirs and testimonies of former OUN and UPA leaders, was used in this analysis in order to fill in the gaps as much as possible. It was not possible in all instances to cite all analyzed sources because of space limitations. The analysis excludes non-OUN and non-UPA members of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, which was created in the middle of 1944 and played a largely ceremonial role. This study also analyzes documents concerning the OUN and the UPA, local police, and Nazi genocide from the State Archive of the Volyn Oblast (DAVO), the State

7 Marples, *Heroes and Villains*.

8 Petro Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armiiia, 1943–49* [Ukrainian Insurgent Army, 1943–1949], Vol. 1-2, New York 1994–1995.

Archive of the Rivne Oblast (DARO), the Archive of the State Security Service of Ukraine in the Volyn Oblast (USBU), the Archive of the State Security Service of Ukraine (HDA SBU), the National Archives in the United States, and a number of other archives.

## Previous Studies

There are a growing number of academic studies on the OUN and the UPA not only in Ukraine, but also in the West, Poland, and Russia. These studies embrace differing views of these organizations. Many issues, in particular the involvement of the OUN and the UPA in Nazi-led genocide, still remain debated or not sufficiently researched.<sup>9</sup>

Research on the OUN and the UPA in the Soviet Union was restricted, censored, and often driven by communist ideology, which depicted these organizations as 'bourgeois nationalist' and close allies of Nazi Germany. However, for similar reasons, the issue of the OUN-UPA's involvement in the genocide of Jews and the ethnic cleansing of Poles was largely ignored in the Soviet Union. The Nachtigall battalion commanded by **Shukhevych** was accused in the Soviet Union of perpetrating the killings of thousands of residents in Lviv. Some recent studies make similar claims about the Nachtigall and maintain without providing any sources that the UPA was created by the German military intelligence (Abwehr) and that the UPA leaders were active Abwehr agents.<sup>10</sup> While such claims about the involvement of the entire Nachtigall battalion in the Lviv pogrom are not supported by contemporary historians, there is evidence of participation by individual members of this unit in the Lviv pogrom and shootings of Jews in two villages near Vinnytsia by the battalion.<sup>11</sup>

While Western scholarship about the OUN and the UPA was more open and relatively more balanced, it was also affected by the Cold War politics. Western studies, par-

9 John-Paul Himka, *The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Police, and the Holocaust*, paper presented at the 7<sup>th</sup> Annual Danyliw Research Seminar, University of Ottawa 2011; John-Paul Himka, *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust*, Paper presented at the 41<sup>st</sup> National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Boston 2009; Katchanovski, *Terrorists or National Heroes*; Ivan Katchanovski, *OUN(b) ta natsyski masovi vbyvstva vlitku 1941 roku na istorychnii Volyni* [The OUN-B and the Nazi mass murders in the summer of 1941 in historic Volhynia], in: *Ukraina moderna* 20 (2014), 215-244; Marples, *Heroes and Villains*; Per Anders Rudling, *The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust. A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths*. Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, Center for Russian and East European Studies, Pittsburgh University 2011.

10 See for instance: A. Voitsekhovskiy/Zh. Dygas/H. Tkachenko, *Bez prava na reabilitatsiiu* [Without right for rehabilitation], Kyiv 2006.

11 John-Paul Himka, *The Lviv Pogrom of 1941. The Germans, Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Carnival Crowd*, in: *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 53 (2011) 2/4, 209-243; Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government (TsDAVO) Fond 3833, Opys [Box] 1, Sprava [Folder] 57, 17.

ticularly by Ukrainian diaspora scholars, frequently minimized or ignored the OUN's and UPA's involvement in mass murder. They often relied on OUN sources in the West, while ignoring or discounting Soviet sources as unreliable.<sup>12</sup> Many OUN and UPA leaders and members after the end of the Second World War found refuge in Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany, and the governments of these countries often withheld or did not properly investigate information about their involvement in the mass killings in Ukraine. US-American and British intelligence agencies used many OUN and UPA leaders in exile for intelligence and propaganda purposes against the Soviet Union, and they aided the UPA underground in Soviet Ukraine in the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s.<sup>13</sup>

Publications produced by former leaders and members of the OUN and the UPA and their followers in the West generally presented these organizations as belonging to a movement for the independence of Ukraine while minimizing or ignoring their participation in the mass murders. Similar approaches were adopted by many historians of the OUN and the UPA in post-Soviet Ukraine. They often uncritically relied on documents or memoirs produced by OUN and UPA leaders and members, who had a vested interest in presenting favorable histories of their organizations. In contrast, Ukrainian, American, Jewish, Polish, and Russian archival documents and testimonies were often marginalized or used selectively.<sup>14</sup>

The analysis of ideology and policy of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which split into the Bandera faction and the Melnyk faction in 1940, primarily because of tactical and leadership differences, shows that it was a semi-totalitarian organization that combined elements of extreme nationalism and fascism. Although the OUN-B formally declared independent Ukraine run as a dictatorship as its ultimate goal, the reliance on collaboration with Nazi Germany in the beginning of the war meant that OUN-B leaders in practice pursued the creation of a quasi-independent client Ukrainian state that would be similar to the Ustaša regime in Croatia or the clerical dictatorship in Slovakia – either allied with Nazi Germany, or the latter's protectorate.<sup>15</sup>

Adolf Hitler and the Nazi leadership refused to accept a quasi-independent Ukrainian state, however, because they regarded Ukraine as a place for German colonization and planned to annihilate, exile to Siberia, or use as forced laborers most Ukrainians,

12 See for example: John Alexander Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, New York 1963.

13 Richard Breitman/Norman J. W. Goda/Timothy Naftali/Robert Wolfe, *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*, New York 2005.

14 See for example: *Litopys Ukrainskoi Povstanskoj Armii* [Chronicle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army], Vol. 1-47, Toronto 1976–2009; *Litopys UPA* [Chronicle of the UPA] Vol. 1-22, Kyiv 1995–2013.

15 OUN v 1941 rotsi. Dokumenty [OUN in 1941. Documents], Kyiv 2006; *Ukrainskie natsionalisticheskie organizatsii v gody Vtoroj mirovoj voiny. Dokumenty* [Ukrainian nationalist organizations during the Second World War], Vol. 1-2, Moscow 2012, 79.

whom they regarded as racially inferior.<sup>16</sup> The OUN-B viewed Jews, Poles, and Russians as hostile minorities.<sup>17</sup> Although its official ideology abandoned many of the extreme elements after 1943, actual policies of the OUN-B did not change accordingly. For example, the UPA in 1943 undertook an ethnic cleansing campaign against Poles in Volhynia, and the OUN-UPA relied on attacks against suspected pro-Soviet civilians who were their main casualties in 1944–1954.<sup>18</sup>

The OUN and the UPA can both be classified as terrorist organizations because their actions correspond to academic definitions of terrorism as the use of violence against civilians by non-state actors in order to intimidate and to achieve political goals. There is also evidence of the involvement of the OUN in international terrorism, in particular, a reported German-led plot to assassinate U.S. President Roosevelt in 1940–1941 and OUN's assistance to Croatian Ustaša subversives in the assassination of the King of Yugoslavia in France in 1934.<sup>19</sup>

Some studies conclude that the OUN-B and the local militia that it formed helped to organize anti-Jewish pogroms in a large number of Western Ukrainian towns and cities in the summer of 1941.<sup>20</sup> The overall casualties of these pogroms are estimated as ranging between 13,000 and 35,000.<sup>21</sup> However, the analysis of Einsatzgruppen reports and eyewitness testimonies indicates that these casualties are likely to be overstated by an order of magnitude. Many of them died not in local pogroms, but in shooting operations conducted under the leadership of the SS and police, which coincided with the pogroms but in which OUN and Ukrainian militia personnel participated. SS and German police forces instigated many of the most extensive pogroms, such as those in Lviv, Ternopil, Kremianets, Zolochiv, and Zboriv and guided the initial violence towards systematic mass shootings. For instance, Einsatzgruppen reports, the trials of their leaders, and a

16 Ivan Katchanovski, *The Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides in Orange Ukraine*, in: *Europe-Asia Studies* 62 (2010) 6, 973-997.

17 Karel C. Berkhoff/Marco Carynnyk, *The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets'ko's 1941 Zhyttiepyss*, in: *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 23 (1999) 3-4, 149-184; Rudling, *The OUN*.

18 Ivan Katchanovski, *Ethnic Cleansing, Genocide or Ukrainian-Polish Conflict? The Mass Murder of Poles by the OUN and the UPA in Volhynia*, Paper presented at the 19<sup>th</sup> Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, New York 2014; Jared McBride, *Peasants into Perpetrators: The OUN-UPA and the Ethnic Cleansing of Volhynia, 1943–1944*, in: *Slavic Review* 75 (2016) 3, 630-654; *Politychnyi teror i teroryzm v Ukraini: XIX-XX st.* [Political Terror and Terrorism in Ukraine: 19<sup>th</sup>–20<sup>th</sup> centuries], Kyiv 2002, 770-771.

19 Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Henry Field Papers, Box 52, Folder "1964"; National Archives, Department of State Confidential Decimal File, Case 800.20211/Matzejko.

20 Ray Brandon/Wendy Lower (ed.), *The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization*, Bloomington (IN) 2008; Himka, *The Lviv Pogrom*; Dieter Pohl, *Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Western Ukraine. A Research Agenda*, in: Eleazar Barkan/Elizabeth A. Cole/Kai Struve (ed.), *Shared History-Divided Memory. Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939–1941*, Leipzig 2007, 305-313; Himka, *The Lviv Pogrom*; Shmuel Spector, *The Holocaust of Volhynian Jews, 1941–1944*, Jerusalem 1990.

21 Pohl, *Anti-Jewish Pogroms*, 306.

comprehensive study of the Lviv pogrom on July 1, 1941 indicate that German detachments, assisted by OUN-B-organized militia, shot the majority of the victims, who numbered several thousand – primarily Jews but also Poles and Ukrainians, in the days following the pogrom in the beginning of July 1941.<sup>22</sup>

Previous studies show that the militia organized by OUN-B marching groups and their local leaders assisted the Einsatzgruppen and other German formations in the mass shootings of more than 50,000 Jews, Soviet activists and POWs, and Poles in summer 1941.<sup>23</sup> In addition, the UPA, established after the German occupation forces had already annihilated the majority of Jews in Ukraine, killed on its own initiative at least a thousand Jews who had survived the first round of shooting operations.<sup>24</sup>

The analysis of previous studies shows that a very small number of Jews, most likely up to a few dozen, served in the UPA, primarily as doctors and craftsmen. Jews were either forced to join in order to evade the German killing squads, in particular by hiding their Jewish identity, or they were forcibly recruited by the UPA. The UPA accepted them or recruited them by force because it needed medical and other such services for which its personnel did not possess the skills or training or because it was not aware of their real identity. Most of these Jews were killed later by the UPA.<sup>25</sup>

Most recent studies focus on the genocide of Jews in German-occupied Ukraine. The Nazi mass murder of the Jews was the most comprehensive and recognized case of genocide. It intended to eliminate the entire Jewish population in Ukraine and other German-occupied territories. This plan resulted in the mass murder of the overwhelming majority of the Jews in these lands; only the military defeat of Nazi Germany, primarily by the Red Army put a halt to the mass murder of not only Jews but also Ukrainians. The Germans and their collaborators killed about 1.4 million Jews in Ukraine, including the Distrikt Galizien of the Government General and Romanian-occupied Transnistria.<sup>26</sup> Many previous studies explicitly or implicitly attribute the mass murder of Jews to the Ukrainians, either armed units or the local population. The Ukrainians are referred to as perpetrators of the mass murders or as supporters of the OUN, the UPA, and the Ukrainian auxiliary police.<sup>27</sup> However, only a small number of studies have specifically examined the role of the Ukrainian militia and the auxiliary police in the mass murders of Jews.<sup>28</sup> The overall extent of the OUN and the UPA links to the militia and the police and

their leaders and members involvement in the genocide of Jews remain largely undetermined.

There is a lack of studies of the role of the OUN and the UPA in the murder of non-Jewish victims, including Ukrainians, Poles, Russians, Belarusians, and Roma. Nazi genocidal policy envisioned, for instance in ‘*Generalplan Ost*’, and partly succeeded in a physical elimination of a significant part of these Slavic peoples and Roma regarded by Nazi ideology and leadership as racially inferior.<sup>29</sup> This policy differed in its scope and methods from the intended and largely implemented complete annihilation of Jews. However, such policy of the annihilation of significant parts of ethnic groups fits definitions of genocide specified by the *UN Genocide Convention* and many researchers of genocide. It is also comparable to other cases of mass annihilation of significant parts of ethnic or social groups, such as Armenians in Turkey and *kulaks* – rich peasants – and upper classes in Stalin’s Soviet Union, in particular in Soviet Ukraine during the artificial famine of 1932/1933 that also included other peasants resisting collectivization and grain requisition.<sup>30</sup> The overwhelming majority of the estimated 27 million of people who died during the Second World War in the Soviet Union, including about seven million in Ukraine, perished as a result of Nazi-genocidal population policy that relied not only on the mass killing of civilians and POWs, but also on the deliberate creation of conditions that resulted in their death from the deprivation of food, shelter, and medical care.<sup>31</sup>

About 4,000–6,000 members of auxiliary police formations in Volhynia in March through April 1943 deserted their police units or with their entire units on an OUN order.<sup>32</sup> These former policemen and commanders had a key role in the formation of the UPA, established in Volhynia in spring 1943. However, the previous role of these UPA members as auxiliary police in the mass murder operations is often ignored or minimized by many Ukrainian historians. For example, one study maintains that, as of the beginning of 1944 16 percent out of 1,445 UPA members in the Bohun military district had previously served in German police and military formations. Nevertheless, their UPA personnel files referred only vaguely to previous service and rank in ‘foreign armies’, and no mention of previous service in police formations.<sup>33</sup> In some of the apologetic works, this lack of specific information about police service is interpreted as if there

22 Himka, *The Lviv Pogrom*; Alexander Kruglov (ed.), *Sbornik dokumentov ob unichtozhenii natsistami evreiev Ukrainy v 1941–1944 godakh* [Collection of documents concerning annihilation of Jews of Ukraine by the Nazis in 1941–1944], Kyiv 2002, 132–133, 151–153.

23 Katchanovski, OUN(b).

24 Himka, *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army*.

25 Himka, *The Ukrainian Insurgent Army*; Spector, *The Holocaust*.

26 Brandon/Lower, *The Shoah*, 11.

27 See for instance: Spector, *The Holocaust*.

28 Martin Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44*, New York 1999.

29 Götz Aly/Susanne Heim, *Architects of Annihilation. Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction*, Princeton 2002; Katchanovski, *The Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides*.

30 Katchanovski, *The Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides*; R. J. Rummel, *Democide. Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder*, New Brunswick 1992.

31 Katchanovski, *The Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides*; Jacques, Vallin/France Mesle/Serguei Adamets/Serhii Pyrozhkov, *A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s*, in: *Population Studies* 56 (2002) 3, 249–264.

32 Litopys UPA, Vol. 2, xii; Dean, *Collaboration*, 145.

33 Ivan Patryliak, “Evedentsiini kartky” UPA iak statystychni dzhherelo [“Evidential files” of the UPA as a statistical source], in: *Ukrainskyi vyzvolnyi rukh* 6, Lviv 2006, 110–147.

were no police service. Such authors also inflate the total membership of the UPA by, for example, uncritically citing German and Soviet estimates or postwar OUN publications, which often put the UPA membership at around 100,000 or even more with the intent of driving down the percentage of UPA members actually involved in Nazi crimes.<sup>34</sup>

One can estimate on the basis of information reported by top commanders of the UPA that its maximal membership was 19,000 to 22,000. The data provided by UPA commanders concerning strength of their units is much more reliable than German or Soviet military and intelligence estimates or estimates made by historians and the OUN and UPA exiles in the West. A detailed description of the strength of UPA units in documents seized by the Soviet security forces from Dmytro Klyachivsky, the commander of the UPA-North, shows that the maximum strength of the UPA-North and the UPA-South reached about 7,000 by April 1944. Afterwards, the Soviet advance swiftly decimated their numbers, which dropped to 2,600 by September 1944.<sup>35</sup> Oleksander Lutsy testified that the strength of the UPA-West, which he organized and commanded at first, reached 12,000 to 15,000 by March 1944.<sup>36</sup>

Some studies argue that the mass murder of Poles committed by the UPA constituted genocide.<sup>37</sup> However, the mass murder of Poles in Volhynia by the UPA cannot be classified as genocide because there is no evidence of the intent of the OUN and the UPA to eliminate entire or a significant part of the Polish nation, and their anti-Polish actions were mostly limited to a relatively small region of Ukraine. The UPA conducted a campaign of mass terror against the Polish minority in Volhynia in 1943 and, to a lesser extent, in Galicia in 1944 with an aim of ethnic cleansing.<sup>38</sup>

Some studies estimate Polish casualties of the OUN and the UPA at some 130,000, including 40,000–60,000 in Volhynia.<sup>39</sup> However, these estimates are inflated because of the unwarranted extrapolation of the casualties from the known locations of the mass murders of Poles to locations where information about murders of Poles is lacking, or where no Poles or very small number of them lived. The Polish casualty numbers are also inflated because of the inclusion of victims of other nationalist formations, the Ukrainian police, SS Galicia Division, unidentified 'Ukrainians', and even pro-Soviet militia, or unjustified assumptions about the scale of the movement of Poles and the losses of the

Polish population attributed to German actions. A more reliable preliminary estimate of 35,000 casualties in Volhynia is derived on the basis of both documented casualties, adjusted to exclude casualties that are not linked to actions of the UPA in 1943/1944, and demographic changes of the Polish population adjusted for undercounting excessive deaths and other losses linked to German genocidal policies and the number of Poles drafted into the Polish Army in 1944/1945. Although a significant proportion (at least ten percent) of the ethnic Poles in Volhynia was killed by the UPA, the Polish casualties comprised about one percent of the prewar population of Poles in territories where the UPA was active and 0.2 percent of the entire ethnically Polish population in Ukraine and Poland.<sup>40</sup>

## The OUN, the UPA, and the Nazi Genocide

The analysis of 119 biographies of the top echelon of OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine shows that at least two third (66 percent) of them served in the regional and local police, militia, and administration, the Nachtigall and Roland Battalions, Bergbauern-Hilfe (the Sushko Legion), the SS Galicia Division, studied in German or German-sponsored military and intelligence schools, or collaborated in various capacities with intelligence and security agencies of Nazi Germany, primarily at the beginning of the Second World War. At least 42 percent of the OUN-B and UPA leaders and commanders were in the auxiliary police, militia, the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, militia or police schools, and other police and quasi-police formations. Twenty nine percent of them were in intelligence, military, and security schools in Germany and German-occupied Poland. 14 percent of the OUN and UPA top rank had positions in the regional and local administration in Ukraine during the occupation. Twelve percent were in the Nachtigall and Roland Battalions and Bergbauern-Hilfe and three percent in the SS Galicia Division and other German and Axis military formations (Table 1).

34 See: Sodal, *Ukrainska*, Vol. 1, 46–47.

35 *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 14, 71-79. This number does not include members of the SB, the OUN-B underground, and local self-defense units.

36 *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 9, Kyiv 2007, 341.

37 See for example: Władysław Siemaszko/Ewa Siemaszko, *Ludobojstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia, 1939–1945* [Genocide conducted by Ukrainian nationalists against Polish people in Volhynia, 1939–1945], Warsaw 2000.

38 Katchanovski, *Ethnic Cleansing*.

39 Grzegorz Hrytsiuk, *Vtraty naselennia na Volyni u 1941–1944rr.* [Population losses in Volhynia in 1941–1944], *Ukraina-Polshcha: Vazhki Pytannia* [Ukraine-Poland: Difficult Questions], Vol. 5, Warsaw 2001, 262; Siemaszko/Siemaszko, *Ludobojstwo*, 94.

40 Hrytsiuk, *Vtraty*, 249-70; Siemaszko/Siemaszko, *Ludobojstwo*, 1045-1057; TsDAVO, Fond 582, Opys 11, Sprava 12 [Editorial note: Recognizing that both Polish and Ukrainian scholars tend to maximize their own losses at each other's hands, while minimizing the losses of their rivals, Keith Lowe gives what he calls "the most conservative estimates" of around 50,000 Polish civilians killed in Volhynia and 20,000 Ukrainian civilians; see: Keith Lowe, *Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II*, New York/St. Martins 2012, 219].

Collaboration of the OUN-B leaders and UPA commanders with Nazi Germany and other Axis countries during the Second World War (in percent)<sup>41</sup>

	Top rank			Middle rank		
	UPA*	SB	OUN-B, SB, UChKh, & UPA	UPA*	SB	OUN-B, SB, UChKh, & UPA
Police/militia and other similar formations	58	36	42	49	15	41
Nachtigall & Roland battalions and Bergbauern-Hilfe (Sushko Legion)	16	7	12	25	0	20
SS Galicia Division and other German & allied military formations	1	0	3	8	0	7
Local and regional administration	20	7	14	5	0	4
Intelligence, military, and security schools	29	29	29	8	8	8
Intelligence and security agencies	28	21	28	5	0	5
Total, percent**	78	64	66	66	23	55
Total, number of persons	69	14	119	165	13	210

\* Excludes the SB (Security Service) and the Ukrainian Red Cross (UChKh), which were controlled by the OUN-B but also acted, respectively, as the security service and the medical service of the UPA.

\*\* Total percent reflects all forms of collaboration, which in many cases of OUN and UPA leaders and commanders included more than one form of collaboration.

German, OUN-B, and Soviet archival documents, testimonies, and historical studies indicate that a minimum of 28 percent of the top leaders and commanders of the OUN-B and the UPA worked for, or collaborated in other ways with, the German intelligence and security agencies. This included primarily the military intelligence office of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (Amt Auslands/Abwehr der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), and to a lesser extent, the I-C departments in the German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres) and at the Division level, as well as for the German Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei – SiPo) and Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst

41 Calculated from Sodol, *Ukrainska; Litopys UPA*; archival documents from the HDA SBU archive, state archives of Volyn and Rivne Oblasts, various memoirs and testimonies of former OUN and UPA leaders, and other historical studies and archival documents.

– SD). Adding participation in intelligence and security services schools; Bergbauern-Hilfe, which was organized by Abwehr and the OUN for use in the war against Poland; and Nachtigall and Roland Battalions, which were organized by Abwehr and the OUN-B for use in the war against the Soviet Union, at least 48 percent of the top UPA commanders collaborated formally or informally with the German intelligence and security services during the war. Similar evidence indicates that such collaboration was typically sanctioned by the OUN and UPA leadership. It involved intelligence-gathering, sabotage, and other such activities against Poland and the Soviet Union. The organizational collaboration of the OUN-B with the German security and intelligence agencies took place primarily from the 1930s until the end of the summer of 1941, when these agencies started mass arrests of OUN-B leaders and members. It resumed to a significant extent since the beginning of 1944 following negotiations of OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine with representatives of Abwehr, I-C, the Security Police (SiPo) and SD, and terminated only with the defeat of Nazi Germany. There is evidence that chief OUN-B and UPA leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, Mykola Lebed, Yaroslav Stetsko, Roman Shukhevych, Dmytro Kliachivsky, and Vasyl Kuk, were involved in organizing or personally carrying out this collaboration.<sup>42</sup>

The analysis of 210 biographies of mostly middle-rank OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine, such as commanders of regiments (zahirin), battalions (kurin), and companies (sotnia); members of command and staff of military districts; and commanders of training schools, the Security Service (SB), and the medical service; and regional leaders of security, propaganda, female, and other sections of the OUN-B, produces a similar pattern. More than half (55 percent) of them collaborated with Germany and its Axis allies in occupied Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus. Specifically, a minimum of 41 percent of them were in the police/militia, the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, and other police formations, 20 percent in the Nachtigall and Roland Battalions and Bergbauern-Hilfe, eight percent in intelligence, military, and security schools, seven percent in the SS Galicia Division and other German military formations, and four percent in the local and regional administration. In addition, at least five percent collaborated with Abwehr or Romanian intelligence (see table).

The percentages of Nazi collaborators among the OUN-B and UPA leadership are likely to be higher since information concerning their activities at the beginning of the war is not available in many cases. A large numbers of them were in OUN-B marching groups, which organized militia and administration mainly in Western Ukraine in the summer of 1941.

42 Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Henry Field Papers, Box 52, Folder “1964”; National Archives, Department of State Confidential Decimal File, Case 800.20211/Matzejko; *Litopys Ukrainskoi*, Vol. 27 (1997), 180-236; OUN, 241-243, 317, 426/427; State Archive Branch of the Security Services of Ukraine (HDA SBU), Fond 13, Sprava 372, Vol. 001, 034, 035, 057.

This biographical analysis shows that the UPA was controlled by the Bandera faction of the OUN. At least 90 percent of the top commanders of the UPA, including its security and medical services, were members of the OUN-B or its youth branch, while one percent belonged to the OUN-M prior to joining the UPA. At least 56 percent of middle-ranked UPA commanders belonged to the OUN-B or its youth wing, and four percent were former members of the Melnyk faction. The extent of the OUN-B control of the UPA is likely to be larger, since the information concerning the party memberships of the four percent of its top echelon and 27 percent of its middle-ranked command are not available.

The upper OUN-B and UPA leadership was comprised of 71 percent Galicians, 20 percent Volhynians, six percent from historically Eastern Ukraine (pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine), and one percent from Bukovyna. The middle echelon included 53 percent from Galicia, 17 percent from Volhynia, five percent from historically Eastern Ukraine, two percent from Transcarpathia, and one percent from Bukovina, while the birthplace region of 19 percent is unknown. The analysis identified 0.3 percent non-Ukrainians, in particular, no Jews among the 329 top- and middle-ranked OUN and UPA leaders. The single non-ethnic Ukrainian was an Azeri middle-ranked UPA commander, who defected to the UPA-North along with some 160 other Azeris from a police formation.<sup>43</sup>

At least 78 percent of the top- and 66 percent of middle-ranked UPA commanders collaborated with Nazi Germany.<sup>44</sup> Minimum more than half (58 percent) of the top-ranked and about half (49 percent) of the middle-ranked members of the UPA had prior service in police or militia during the German occupation. Former policemen, who served in various police or militia formations in German-occupied Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus, held, at various times, the following top positions in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: supreme commander and the chief of the general staff of the UPA, commanders or chiefs of staffs of all three areas (the UPA-North, the UPA-West, and the UPA-South), and commanders or chiefs of staff of at least ten out of eleven military districts. At least 62 percent of the commanders of military battalions and companies in the UPA-North and the UPA-South as of 1944 previously collaborated with the Germans, including 54 percent who served in police formations.<sup>45</sup>

A large number of the top commanders of the UPA served in the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 the end of 1941 until the end of 1942. For example, the former officers of this police battalion included Roman Shukhevych, Oleksander Lutsky, and Vasyl Sydor. Shukhevych was one of the leaders of the OUN-B after the OUN split in 1940 and the supreme commander of the UPA from 1943 until he was killed by the Soviet security

43 Sodal, *Ukrainska*, Vol. 2, 107-108.

44 Excludes the Security Service (SB) and the Ukrainian Red Cross (UChKh) of the OUN and the UPA.

45 Calculated from Sodal, *Ukrainska*; Litopys UPA, Vol. 14, Kyiv 2010, 71-79; other volumes of Litopys UPA, archival documents from the HDA SBU archive, state archives of Volyn and Rivne Oblasts, various memoirs and testimonies of former OUN and UPA leaders.

forces in 1950. Oleksander Lutsky organized and became the first commander of the UPA-West, which was based mainly in Galicia. Vasyl Sydor served as the commander of UPA-West from 1944 to 1949.

Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 likely was involved in shooting operations against Jews and Belorussian under German occupation.<sup>46</sup> The highly disproportionate number of Soviet partisans that the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 reportedly killed in Belarus (more than 2,000) compared to its own losses (49) indicates that the majority of the partisans were civilians murdered under the pretext of anti-partisan operations.<sup>47</sup>

Many top regional commanders of the UPA and regional leaders of the OUN-B served as militia or police commanders in German-occupied Ukraine. For example, Mykola Kovtoniuk (Yakymchuk), the commandant of the Lutsk city militia in the summer of 1941 and an OUN-B leader in the Volyn Oblast, became the first commander of the Turiv district of the UPA-North.<sup>48</sup> Omelian Hrabets, the leader of the OUN-B in the Rivne Oblast in 1941/1942 and the commander of the UPA-South in 1943/1944, headed the regional militia in Rivne in the summer of 1941.<sup>49</sup> Archival documents and eyewitness reports indicate that the OUN-controlled militia assisted in the mass shootings in these two largest Volhynian towns in the summer of 1941, and that at least 1,500 people were killed, primarily Jews and significant numbers of Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, Stepan Yanishevsky, a deputy commander of the police in Vinnytsia in 1941–1943, became the acting head of the Zahrava district of the UPA-North.<sup>51</sup>

At least 36 percent of former police commanders and members occupied leading positions in the SB OUN-B, which also served as the security services of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. For example, Yaroslav Diakon, the head of the SB in the Lviv Oblast in 1942–1944 and the acting head of the SB OUN-B in 1947/1948, commanded the auxiliary police in the town of Bobrki in the Lviv Oblast and took part in the mass shootings of Jews in this town in April 1943.<sup>52</sup> Panas Kovalchuk, a commander of the police in the town of Torchyn in the Volyn Oblast, participated in the mass shootings of more than 3,000 Jews and a large number of Ukrainians in 1941/1942, and then he became the head

46 See: Dean, Collaboration; Oleh Klymenko/Serhii Tkachov, *Ukrainci v politzii v Reichskomissariati 1941–44 rr.* (Pivdenna Volyn) [Ukrainians in the police in the Reichskommissariat 1941–44 (Southern Volhynia)], Kharkiv 2012; Per Anders Rudling, *Szkolenie w mordowaniu. Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 i Hauptmann Roman Szučewycz na Białorusi 1942 roku* [Training in murder, Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 and Hauptmann Roman Shukhevych in Belarus in 1942] in: Bogusław Paz (ed.), *Prawda historyczna a prawda polityczna w badaniach naukowych. Przykład ludobójstwa na kresach południowej-wschodniej Polski w latach 1939–1946* [Historical Truth and Political Truth in Scientific Studies. Example of Genocide in East Southern Kresy of Poland in 1939–1946], Wrocław 2011, 191-212.

47 Rudling, *Szkolenie*.

48 State Archive of the Volyn Oblast (DAVO), Fond R-97, Opys 1, Sprava 1.

49 Litopys UPA, Vol. 9, 702, 775.

50 See: Katchanovski, OUN(b); Spector, *The Holocaust*, 73-76.

51 Sodal, *Ukrainska*, Vol. 1, 136.

52 Jeffrey Burds, *Sovetskaya agentura [Soviet Agents]*, Moscow 2008, 97-98.

of the SB in the Volyn Oblast in 1943/1944 and the head of the SB of the North-Western area of Ukraine in 1948/1949.<sup>53</sup>

Simultaneous and coordinated mass defections of the auxiliary police units across Volhynia on OUN-B orders and subsequent joining in the UPA by the majority of them indicate that the Bandera faction exercised de-facto control over a significant part of the police in Volhynia. For example, analyses of OUN-B reports, archival documents, eyewitness interviews, and Soviet reports indicate that a significant proportion, or all policemen and/or their commanders from 95 percent of 62 regional and district centers that existed in January 1943 on the territory of the former Volhynian Voivodship (the Volyn Oblast, the Rivne Oblast, and the Kremenets area) had abandoned their service in 1943 and joined the UPA. Such information concerning the five percent of small district centers (Ludvypol [Sosnove], Radyvyliv, and Sedlyshche) are lacking.

Nearly the entire Schutzmannschaft battalion 103 and significant percentages of officers and members of Schutzmannschaft battalions 101, 102, 104, 105, 109, 114, and 201 joined the UPA, primarily from the spring of 1943 until the end of the year.<sup>54</sup> Each of these battalions included several hundred servicemen. Mass desertions to the UPA in 1943 included other police formations, such as railroad police in the Kovel area and about 300 members of the agricultural police school, which was formed on the basis of a militia school that was created by the OUN-B in Lutsk in the summer of 1941.<sup>55</sup> OUN-B and UPA reports indicate that they were joined by at least several hundred policemen from Central and Eastern Ukraine, plus at least a few hundred members of the police formations created from national minorities among Soviet POWs, such as Azeries. Many members of the Taras Borovets (Taras Bulba) and the OUN-M armed formations, which were incorporated into the UPA by force, served in militia/police units controlled by Borovets and the OUN-M. In the summer of 1941, Borovets organized with German approval Poliska Sich, which served as a militia. Its members assisted in the mass murder of the Jews, for instance, in Olevska.<sup>56</sup> Borovets turned a part of his militia in 1942 into a nationalist partisan formation that was initially called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), while its other part joined the auxiliary police.<sup>57</sup>

53 Hryhorii Hurtovyi, *Evrei mistechka Torchyn* [Jewish town Torchyn], Kyiv 2003, 153-158; Sodol, *Ukrainska*, Vol. 1, 87.

54 See for example: Andrii Bolianovsky, *Ukrainski viiskovi formuvannia v zbroinykh sylakh Nimechchyny (1939–1945)* [Ukrainian military formations in the armed forces of Germany (1939–1945)], Lviv 2003; Ivan Dereiko, *Mistsevi formuvannia nimetskoï armii ta politicii v Raikhskomissariat "Ukraina" (1941–1944 roky)* [Local Formations of the German Army and police in Reichskommissariat Ukraine (1941–1944)], Kyiv 2012, 92; Klymenko/Tkachov, *Ukrainci*.

55 HDA SBU, *Sprava 75175 FP*.

56 Jared McBride/Alexander Kruglov, *Olevska*, in: Geoffrey P. Megargee/Martin Dean (ed.), *The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, 1933–1945*, Vol. II., Bloomington (IN) 2012, 1554.

57 Taras Bulba Borovets, *Armiia bez derzhavy* [Army without state], Winnipeg 1981.

Comprehensive analyses of historical studies, and testimonies of archival documents, publications, and testimonies concerning all district centers and main towns, as well as police battalions and schools in Volhynia and the defections of specific police formations and commanders to the UPA indicates that some 6,000 to 8,000 former policemen and militiamen joined the UPA on OUN-B orders there in 1943. The total comprised more than half of all UPA members at least until the end of 1943. In the UPA-North and the UPA-South, the former policemen constituted the absolute majority at least until the beginning of 1944. As noted, the UPA-North and the UPA-South units included about 7,000 members by the time of the Soviet advance in January/February 1944.<sup>58</sup> The UPA-West was established in December 1943 on the basis of the Ukrainian People's Self-Defence (UNS), which was organized by the OUN-B in Galicia in the summer of 1943 to counter a raid by a large Soviet partisans unit led by Sydir Kovpak, and transformed into the UPA-West in December 1943. According to the testimony of Lutsky, the organizer of the UNS, he had about 2,000 members under his command in August 1943 and 5,000 to 6,000 members by December 1943. Most of UNS top commanders, including Lutsky, served as police commanders under the Germans during the war.<sup>59</sup>

There are estimates that from 1,000 to 3,000 members of the SS Galicia division, many of whom served previously in various auxiliary police formations, joined the UPA, primarily the UPA-West. At least a couple of hundred members of the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Galician regiments, which initially fulfilled police functions under SS command and later were incorporated into regular units of the SS Galicia Division, also deserted to the UPA.<sup>60</sup> These formations participated in the mass shootings of close to 1,000 Polish residents of Huta Pieniacka with assistance from UPA units and in other massacres of Polish civilians.<sup>61</sup> Former members of the police still constituted a significant proportion of the UPA members until the early fall of 1944 when the combined strength of UPA-North and the UPA-South units declined to 2,600 as a result of Soviet anti-UPA actions, and the UPA-West became the main force of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

Although two small units existed in Volhynia from the end of 1942, OUN-B forces launched the first significant attacks against German forces and Polish civilians only in February 1943. These two OUN-B armed formations were organized and led by commanders who previously served in militia or police (Serhii Kachynsky and Hryts *Perehyniak*). Kachynsky was one of the organizers and commanders of a militia school in Rivne in the summer of 1941 along with Leonid Stupnytski, who became the chief of

58 *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 14, 71-79.

59 *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 9, 336-339.

60 Andrii Bolianovsky, *Dyvizia "Halychyna": Istoriia* [Division "Galicia": A History], Lviv 2000, 216-224, 241-254.

61 Per Anders Rudling, "They Defended Ukraine": The 14. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Galizische Nr. 1) Revisited, in: *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 25 (2012) 3, 329-368.

staff of the UPA-North.<sup>62</sup> The school trained militia members, who assisted in the mass shootings in Rivne conducted by the Germans.<sup>63</sup> Kachynsky's unit formation has been often misrepresented by OUN-B and UPA leaders after the Second World War and commemorated by nationalist politicians in contemporary Ukraine, as the creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army on October 14, 1942.

Many of the anti-German attacks attributed to the UPA coincided with the mass defections of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in Volhynia in March/April 1943. Many locations in Volhynia, in particular an area around a town of Kolky, came under control of the UPA as a result of these mass defections.<sup>64</sup>

Analyses of biographies of the OUN-B and the UPA leaders show that the anti-German activities of the UPA and the Bandera faction of the OUN were relatively minor, especially compared to the anti-Soviet activity. The leaders of the OUN-B and the UPA in Ukraine were much less likely to die consequent to German actions and policies than adult Ukrainian civilians. For example, at most, six percent of the top OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine, in particular three percent of the top UPA commanders, died as result of German actions. In comparison, 54 percent of their upper-echelon leadership, including 55 percent UPA commanders, perished as result of actions of Soviet security and military forces and their Polish, Czechoslovak, and later East German allies. In addition, 20 percent of top OUN-B and UPA leaders were arrested and executed, tried, convicted and imprisoned, or died in detention, on the territory of the Soviet Union and its East Central European allies (after 1947); ten percent escaped to the West. None were prosecuted in Western countries, and some, such as Mykola Lebed, who headed the OUN-B in Ukraine from 1941 to 1943, were used by Western intelligence services, in particular the CIA, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union.<sup>65</sup>

Similarly, German forces, their Axis allies, or local Ukrainian and Polish auxiliary police killed nine percent of the 210 mid-level OUN-B and UPA leaders, in particular five percent of the UPA commanders. In many of these cases, the role of their affiliation with the OUN and UPA in their death is unclear. For example, many of them were killed in 1944 during their attempts to cross the German-Soviet frontline, during arrest attempts, or in crossfire. Some perished during random arrests and shootings or were confused with Soviet partisans and Soviet underground members who were active in the same areas. Conversely, at least 41 percent of the middle-ranked OUN-B and UPA leaders, specifically 43 percent of the UPA commanders, were killed or committed suicide as a result of Soviet actions or the actions of its Polish, Czechoslovak, or Romanian allies. In

62 Sodol, *Ukrainska*, Vol. 1, 125, Vol. 2, 38-39, 76.

63 Jeffrey Burds, *Holocaust in Rovno. The Massacre at Sosenki Forest, November 1941*, New York 2013; Katchanovski, OUN(b).

64 DAVO, Fond R-164, Opy 3, Sprava 12.

65 See: Breitman/Goda/Naftali/Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence.

addition, at least 14 percent were arrested and executed or sentenced in the Soviet Union and on the territory of its East European allies after the war. At least six percent of the total number of middle-ranked OUN-B and UPA leaders, including six percent of UPA commanders, perished at the hands of the SB or were killed by fellow UPA members, mostly as suspected Soviet agents, even though declassified Soviet documents confirm that only one of them was a Soviet agent.

At the same time, at least 32 percent of the top-ranked OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine were arrested, taken as prisoners, or interned at various times during the war by the German security forces, police, military, and other occupation authorities of Germany and Hungary. However, it is striking that all of them, with the exception of Ivan Klymiv, were either released relatively soon or escaped – many more than once. Similarly, Bandera and the majority of top leaders of the OUN who were arrested or detained by the Germans outside of Ukraine were not murdered. German authorities released them before the end of the war, in contrast to the majority of Jewish prisoners and Soviet POWs. This pattern is analogous among the middle-ranked leadership of the UPA and the OUN-B. At least 16 percent of them were arrested by the German police, military, or by the Hungarian and Romanian allies of Nazi Germany, but the overwhelming majority of them (at least 82 percent) were released or escaped.

Police and militia formations, whose commanders or significant proportions of members, following the OUN-B orders, deserted and joined the UPA, participated in implementing Nazi genocidal population before they switched their formal allegiance. Local Ukrainian police and militia commanders and members assisted in annihilation of the Jews by rounding up the Jews and guarding them during the mass shootings, catching and killing escapees and survivors, guarding Jewish ghettos, and in some cases carrying out themselves mass shootings of Jews<sup>66</sup>

Analyses of archival documents, OUN-B reports, eyewitness interviews, and Soviet documents indicate that police and militia commanders and/or significant proportion of police members up to the entire number before joining the UPA served in such capacity in the majority of cities, towns, and district centers in Volhynia and assisted in carrying out the mass murders of Jews in Volhynia. However, the participation of individual police and militia commanders and in many cases individual police units in specific acts of mass murder as well as the specific nature of their involvement in the mass murder generally cannot be determined precisely due to lack of data.

Therefore, the total number of the Jews who lived at the beginning of the German occupation or were shot in these locations from June 1941 until the spring of 1943 provides the maximum estimate of the numbers of Jews killed by the German occupation authorities with assistance of the OUN-B and UPA leaders and members. Approximate

66 See: Brandon/Lower, *The Shoah*; Megargee/Dean, *The United States*; Spector, *The Holocaust*.

numbers of the Jews who were shot or killed by other means with the help of local police or militia in the biggest of the cities, towns, and district centers, in which OUN-B and UPA members commanded the local police or militia formations or in which significant proportions of the policemen defected to the UPA, were as follows: 22,000 to 23,000 in Rivne; 19,000 in Lutsk and Volodymyr-Volynsky; 15,000 to 18,000 in Kovel; 14,000 in Sarny; 9,000 to 13,000 in Dubno; 8,000 in Kremenets; 6,500 to 10,500 in Ostroh; 5,000 in Korets; 4,500 in Kostopil; 4,000 in Rozhyshche; 3,500 in Kamin-Kashyrskyi; 3,000 to 4,000 in Luboml and Horokhiv; 3,000 in Berestechko, Berezhno, Torchyn, Tuchyn, and Ustyluh; 2,500 to 3,000 in Vyshnevets; 2,500 in Olyka, Matsiiv (Lukiv), Rafalivka, and Ratno; 2,000 to 3,000 in Mezhyrich; 2,000 to 2,500 in Manevychi; 2,000 in Kolky, Lanivtsi, Mizoch, Shumsk, and Volodymyrets; 1,500 in Lokachi, Mlyniv, Oleksandriia, Porytsk (Staryi Porytsk), Turiisk, and Vysotsk; 1,000 to 1,500 in Klevan; 1,000 in Hoschsha and Pochaiiv; 900 in Ozutychi; 750 in Ostrozhets; 700 in Demydivka, and 300 in Kivertsia.<sup>67</sup>

In Volhynia, the Jews accounted for more than 200,000 among the estimated 400,000 to 500,000 victims of the Nazi population policy implemented against the local population, which consisted of mostly Ukrainians and Poles, and among Soviet POWs, who mostly included Russians and Ukrainians.<sup>68</sup> An estimated 48,000 Soviet POWs were shot or perished from deliberately created conditions that involved hunger, diseases, and forced labor in POW camps in the Volyn Oblast, including 25,000 in Volodymyr-Volynsky, 12,000 in Kovel, and 10,500 out of 14,000 in Lutsk. In the Rivne Oblast, 68,000 POWs were killed, including 30,000 in Rivne, and in POW camps in Dubno, Ostroh, Kostopil, and Korets.<sup>69</sup>

Although the issue is still not well-researched, archival documents indicate that the local militia and police forces that served in Volhynian towns with POWs camps and joined the UPA in 1943 were used in 1941–1943 in capturing, transporting, and guarding the Soviet POWs and assisting in mass shootings of the POWs. For example, the militia in Lutsk, under the command of Kovtoniuk (Yakymchuk) and other OUN-B leaders and members, such as Oleksander Kohut, captured and handed over many Soviet POWs, including Ukrainians, to the German police in the summer of 1941.<sup>70</sup> German occupation authorities deployed the Ukrainian auxiliary police to guard Soviet POWs at Stalag 360 in Lutsk.<sup>71</sup> The militia in the Kremenets area fulfilled similar functions.<sup>72</sup>

67 Megargee/Dean, *The United States; Spector, The Holocaust*, 362–364.

68 Hrytsiuk, *Vtraty*.

69 *Dovidnyk pro tabory, tiumry ta hetto na okupovanii terytorii Ukraïny (1941–1944)* [Directory of camps, prisons and ghettos in occupied territory of Ukraine (1941–1944)], Kyiv 2000; DAVO, Fond R-166, Opys 4, Sprava 16, 2–3.

70 DAVO, Fond R-97, Opys 1, Sprava 1; Archive USBU in the Volyn Oblast, Sprava 1546 FP.

71 DAVO Fond R-2, Opys 2, Sprava 2, 58.

72 Klymenko/Tkachov, *Ukrainci*, 70.

Even though two factions of the OUN often acted as rivals and resorted to killing one another, many OUN-M leaders, who served as police commanders and were likely involved in the mass murder of Jews and Ukrainians, were given commanding positions after they joined the UPA. For example, Ivan Kediulych, one of OUN-M leaders in Western Ukraine, became a commander of a territorial unit in the UPA-West.<sup>73</sup> In the fall of 1941, he and other OUN-M leaders were the organizers and commanders of the Kyiv Kurin and the city police in German-occupied Kyiv. There were other OUN-M members who served in the police or OUN-M marching groups, in particular, in the Bukovynian Kurin that organized local police, and who later joined the UPA.<sup>74</sup> First OUN-M organizers of Kyiv police and some units under their command arrived in Kyiv before the shooting of nearly 34,000 Jews in Babyn Yar (Babi Yar) in the end of September 1941.<sup>75</sup> There is evidence of the involvement of these police units in this and other mass shootings of Jews and Ukrainian and Russian civilians and POWs in Babyn Yar and other locations in Kyiv City.<sup>76</sup>

Similarly, before their desertion to the UPA, the auxiliary police and its commanders helped to implement German efforts to annihilate a large proportion of the Ukrainian population, both directly through mass shootings and indirectly through deliberate creation of such conditions as starvation, hard forced labor, burning of dwellings, and deprivation of medical care.<sup>77</sup> Local police in Ukraine, in particular Volhynia, assisted German occupation authorities in mass killings of residents of entire villages, numerous shootings of civilian hostages and of people who hid Jews and Soviet POWs or violated other laws and regulations that were punishable by death, such as violating curfew, traveling without authorization, and keeping radios and pigeons. The police rounded up people for forced labor, burned villages, and confiscated food that resulted in death of a significant number of Ukrainians from exposure, hunger and diseases.<sup>78</sup>

For example, police from Ratno, Kovel, Kamin-Kashyrskyi, and Zabolottia, along with a company of the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 103, assisted in the mass shootings of close to 3,000 Ukrainians, mainly children and women, in the village of Kortelisy and the neighboring hamlets in the Volyn Oblast in September 1942.<sup>79</sup> In the spring of 1943, entire units or significant factions of the police from all these locations joined the UPA.<sup>80</sup> It is noteworthy that at least seven ex-commanding officers and policemen from these

73 Sodal, *Ukrainska*, Vol. 2, 39.

74 *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 19, Kyiv 2012.

75 HDA SBU, Fond 6, Sprava 69330 FP.

76 Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair. Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule*, Cambridge 2004.

77 Katchanovski, *The Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides*.

78 See for instance: Berkhoff, *Harvest*.

79 DAVO, Fond 597, Opys 1, Sprava 229, 17–18; Archive USBU in the Volyn Oblast, Sprava 67454, Vol. 32, 254; Jared McBride, "A Sea of Blood and Tears", *Ethnicity, Identity and Survival in Nazi Occupied Volhynia, Ukraine 1941–1944*, PhD dissertation, UCLA 2014.

80 Yaroslav Antoniuk, *Dialnist SB OUN na Volyni* [Activity of the SB OUN in Volyn], Lutsk 2007, 25;

units were appointed as kurin and sotnia commanders, while at least four others occupied other commanding positions in the UPA, including the SB. Estimates derived from these numbers suggest that they likely comprised a majority of the top command of the Turiv district that included the whole Volyn Oblast.<sup>81</sup> Their police service and evidence from testimonies and postwar trials indicate that they were either personally involved, likely involved, or bore responsibility as superiors of their police units in the mass murder of Ukrainians in Kortelisy under German occupation.<sup>82</sup> Similarly, the auxiliary police from Tsuman, most of whom joined the UPA in 1943, helped to carry out the mass shootings of more than 130 residents, primarily women and children, in the Ukrainian village of Klubochyn and about 50 residents of the Polish settlement of Oborky in November 1942.<sup>83</sup>

In addition to the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, other police battalions, such as 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 109, and 114, many of whose members later joined the UPA, participated in mass killings of Jews and so-called anti-partisan operations in Ukraine and Belarus, which often involved mass shootings of Ukrainian and Belarusian civilians.<sup>84</sup> For instance, Schutzmannschaft Battalion 103 participated in mass shootings of Jews in Matsiiv, Volodymyr-Volynskyi, Berestechko, Lokachi, and Turiisk.<sup>85</sup>

Many OUN-B leaders and members, who collaborated with German intelligence and security services, primarily until the end of the summer of 1941, were likely involved in the mass murder dictated by Nazi population policy in the occupied Soviet Union. For example, documents from Ukrainian, German, Russian, and US archives indicate collaboration, prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union (1939–1941), of OUN-B leaders with the SiPo and SD.<sup>86</sup> There is evidence that Lebed, who organized and headed the SB in 1940/1941, Shukhevych, and many top SB commanders attended a Security Police School in Zakopane in 1939–1940, but to identify the individuals and their activities will require more research.<sup>87</sup> A letter seized and decoded by the NKVD indicates that the Security Police requested OUN-B leaders, including Shukhevych and Klymiv, and OUN-B regional organizations, specifically in the Volyn Oblast, to compile lists of Soviet

activists prior to the German invasion, with the intent of physically eliminating them.<sup>88</sup> OUN-B marching groups, led by Kuk and Klymyshyn, cooperated with the Einsatzgruppen of the SiPo and SD in the formation of the Ukrainian militia and in the apprehension and shooting of Jews and Soviet activists in the summer of 1941.<sup>89</sup>

Similarly, OUN-B reports reveal the collaboration of the leaders of marching (expeditionary) groups – notably Vasyl Kuk, Yaroslav Stetsko, Yaroslav Starukh, and Mykola Klymyshyn – with Abwehr and intelligence sections (I-C) attached to the Wehrmacht units in intelligence gathering and sabotage and diversion operations in Ukraine during the German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer 1941.<sup>90</sup> These groups were sent by both factions of the OUN to follow the German advance and establish local administration and the police in Ukraine. Such collaboration gave the OUN-B marching (expeditionary) groups the relative freedom of movement and some support from the Wehrmacht, and enabled these marching groups and local OUN-B activists to establish regional and local militia and administrations, primarily in Galicia, Volhynia, the Zhytomyr Oblast, and, to a certain extent, in Kyiv, Khmelnytsky, Vinnytsia, and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts in the summer and early fall of 1941, even after the Germans refused to recognize the Ukrainian state proclaimed on June 30, 1941 in Lviv by a marching group headed by Stetsko. The militia organized by the OUN-B marching groups assisted in mass shootings of Jews, Soviet and Polish activists, and Soviet POWs by the Einsatzgruppen and other German formations in the summer and early fall of 1941.<sup>91</sup>

In many cases, it remains not entirely clear whether collaboration of OUN-B and UPA leaders with the German intelligence and security agencies was informal or whether it was formal, as was the case with at least some of the leaders of OUN-M marching groups, such as Bohdan Onufryk (Konyk) and Stepan Suliatynsky, who used their formal service in an Abwehr Special Detachment (Sonderkommando) to organize local police and administration in the cities and regions of Kyiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv in the fall of 1941.<sup>92</sup> In these and a large number of other locations in Central, Eastern, and Southern Ukraine, the police assisted in the mass murder of Jews, Ukrainian and Russian civilians, and POWs but the extent of the OUN influence in the police in many such locations, with the partial exception of Kharkiv, requires further research.<sup>93</sup>

81 Calculated from Antoniuk, *Dialnist*, 25, 170; *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 14, 65–68, and other publications and archival sources.

82 DAVO, Fond 597, Opys 1, Sprava 229, 17–18; Archive USBU in the Volyn Oblast, Sprava 67454, Vol. 32, 254; McBride, “A Sea of Blood and Tears”; Vladyslav Nakonechnyi, *Volyn – Kryvave pole viiny* [Volyn – Bloody field of the war], Ternopil 2006, 60.

83 DAVO, Fond R-2, Opys 2, Sprava 4.

84 Bolianovsky, *Ukrainski*, 138/139, 148; Dereiko, *Mistsevi*, 105; Klymenko/Tkachov, *Ukraintsi*.

85 Nakonechnyi, *Volyn*, 23, 46; Kruglov, *Sbornik*, 390.

86 Breitman/Goda/Naftali/Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence, 249, 452; Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Henry Field Papers, Box 52, Folder “1964”; National Archives, Department of State Confidential Decimal File, Case 800.20211/Matzejko; HDA SBU, Fond 13, Sprava 372, Vol. 001, 034, 035, 057; *Ukrainskie*.

87 Berkhoff, *Harvest*, 289, 298; Breitman/Goda/Naftali/Wolfe, U.S. Intelligence, 249, 452; Pohl, *Anti-Jewish pogroms*, 309; *Ukrainskie*, Vol. 1, 270–288.

88 Archive USBU in the Volyn Oblast, Sprava 12, 1941, 130–143 (cited from Nakonechnyi, *Volyn*, 53).

89 Katchanovski, OUN(b).

90 OUN, 242–243, 317, 426–427.

91 Katchanovski, OUN(b).

92 HDA SBU, Fond 6, Sprava 69330 FP.

93 Berkhoff, *Harvest*; Megargee/Dean, *The United States; Yuri Radchenko, “We fired all cartridges at them”. Ukrainische Hilfspolizei and the Holocaust on the territory of the Generalbezirk Kharkiv, 1941–1943*, Paper presented at the 8<sup>th</sup> Annual Danyliw Research Seminar, University of Ottawa 2012.

Although the German authorities reorganized the militia into auxiliary police in the fall of 1941 and removed and arrested some OUN-B commanders and members, the OUN-B continued to maintain a substantial presence and informal control over many units of the auxiliary police, especially in Volhynia and Galicia.<sup>94</sup> However, there was also documented activity of SiPo and SD, including Gestapo, directed against the OUN-B and the UPA, primarily, from the end of the summer of 1941 until the end of 1943 and involving mass arrests and, to a lesser extent, shootings.<sup>95</sup>

A platoon (chota) of the 31<sup>st</sup> SMdS battalion (Schutzmannschaft Battalion of SiPo), which was also called the Ukrainian Self-Defense Legion, deserted to the UPA in the middle of 1944, and a significant number of its commanders and members served in the UPA before joining this unit, which was organized by the SD and the OUN-M in Volhynia in the end of 1943.<sup>96</sup> However, most of this battalion was incorporated into the SS Galicia Division. While a number of them were prosecuted in the Soviet Union and Poland, the majority of this battalion's servicemen found refuge after the end of the war in such countries as the UK, the US, and Canada.<sup>97</sup>

A large proportion of commanders and members from the 31<sup>st</sup> security police and SD battalion served in the local militia and police in the Kremenets, Lutsk, and Volodymyr-Volynsky areas when these formations assisted in mass murder of Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles.<sup>98</sup> For example, Mykola Nedzevedsky, who was the town and regional police commandant in Kremenets in 1941–1943, served as an UPA commander after he was forced to join it along with many other members of his OUN-M unit in July 1943 and before most of them deserted and joined the SiPo Battalion 31 in December 1943.<sup>99</sup> Most of the Volodymyr-Volynsky police, which was under informal control of the OUN-M and the OUN-B and participated in local mass shootings of more than 20,000 Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, joined the UPA in 1943. A significant proportion of several dozen members of this battalion from the Volodymyr-Volynsky area worked in the police and the SiPo/SD there, and many of them also were later in the UPA. For, example, Petro Glyn was one of several 31<sup>st</sup> battalion commanders and members, who served in the police or in the SiPo/SD in the town of Volodymyr-Volynsky and nearby locations and can be identified

by name. Glyn also was an adjutant of an UPA company commander in the same area. The main UPA formation there, called Sich, was comprised mostly from former policemen from Volodymyr-Volynsky and neighboring towns and districts, and its commander (Porfyrii Antoniuk) was a police commander in Volodymyr-Volynsky and Olevsk before he joined the UPA in the spring of 1943.<sup>100</sup>

However, when remains of close to 1,500 people were found in 1997 and in 2011–2013 near a former prison in Volodymyr-Volynsky by Ukrainian and Polish archaeologists, Ukrainian and Polish officials, media and experts initially publicly claimed that these were Polish victims of the Katyn-style shootings by the Soviet NKVD in 1939–1941. The evidence, such as historical studies, archival documents, eyewitness testimonies, German bullets, and predominance of children and women in some of the mass graves, indicated that these people were shot by the Germans and the police in 1941–1944. The victims primarily included local Jews, but also many Poles, specifically interwar Polish policemen, a large number of whom joined the AK, and Ukrainian civilians.<sup>101</sup>

The 31<sup>st</sup> security police and SD battalion is implicated by different sources in the mass shootings of Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles in the Volyn Oblast of Ukraine and in Poland. For example, analysis of testimonies by eyewitnesses and former battalion members, interviews with local residents, archival documents, and the fact of the urgent redeployment of this unit from the Kremenets area to the village of Pidhaisi near Lutsk a day before a massacre there indicates a possibility of its involvement in the mass murder of 21 Ukrainian residents of Pidhaisi, half of whom were children, on December 3, 1943, under the pretext of a retaliation for the killing of a German soldier.<sup>102</sup> This security police unit was responsible for shooting about 100 prisoners from the Lutsk prison on the old grounds of the Pidhaisi School in January 1944. Testimonies by local residents and former members of the 31<sup>st</sup> security police and SD battalion and an exhumation of one of the mass graves indicate that the victims of this shooting included both Jews and Ukrainians. In the same month, members of the 31<sup>st</sup> SiPo and SD Battalion located and killed more than 70 Jews, who had been hiding in a forest near Pidhaisi.<sup>103</sup> Testimonies by former legion members implicate the legion, and, specifically, one of its companies

94 Himka, *The Organization*.

95 OUN; *Ukrainskie*.

96 Bolianovsky, *Ukrainski*, 266, 301; Klymenko/Tkachov, *Ukrainsi*, 193–201, 236–259.

97 Preliminary investigations concerning the involvement of Michael Karkoc, who was one of commanders of this security police and SD unit, in massacres committed by the legion were launched in Germany and Poland after the Associated Press story revealed in 2013 that he was living in the US; <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/426815/ap-impact-commander-of-nazi-led-unit-lives-in-us> (December 2, 2018). There is no evidence of prosecutions of any of former legion commanders and members, a number of whom published memoirs, became leaders of the Volhynia society, and prominent Orthodox priests in the UK, the US, and Canada; see: Klymenko/Tkachov, *Ukrainsi*, 236–259.

98 Katchanovski, OUN(b); Klymenko/Tkachov, *Ukrainsi*; HAD SBU, *Sprava* 372, Vol. 032, 182–196.

99 Klymenko/Tkachov, *Ukrainsi*, 99–100, 249.

100 *Ibid.*, 240; Katchanovski, OUN(b); Yaroslav Tsaruk, *Volodymyrshchyna u borotbi za nezalezhnist [Volodymyr-Volynsky Area in Fight for Independence]*, Lutsk 2012, 377, 411, 867.

101 Katchanovski, OUN(b); *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 11, Kyiv 2007, 119; HDA SBU, *Fond* 13, *Sprava* 376, Vol. 071, 6, Vol. 075, 62–67). Similarly, 23 people, mostly Jews from Vienna, whose mass grave was exhumed in 2013 near Drohobych in the Lviv Oblast in Western Ukraine, were misrepresented by local scholars, politicians and the media as victims of NKVD prison shootings in June 1941. This politically-motivated falsification was done in spite of publications by local historians and a published diary of Felix Landau about an execution by his Einsatzkommando of 23 civilians at that location on July 12, 1941; see: Felix Landau, *Love Letters of a Nazi Murderer in Lemberg and Drohobycz*, Haifa 1987.

102 Archive USBU in the Volyn Oblast, *Sprava* F-253; DAVO, *Fond* R-166, *Opys* 4, *Sprava* 16, 4; DAVO, *Fond* R-164, *Opys* 2, *Sprava* 9, 50; *Rising/Herschaft/Scisłowska*, AP Impact; author interview with Mykola Traskovsky, Pidhaisi, July 4, 2011.

103 *Nakonechnyi*, Volyn, 24.

under command of Michael Karkoc, in massacres of Polish residents of Korchunsky and Edvardpole in the Volodymyr-Volynsky area and Chlaniow, Wladislawin, and Ameryka in the Lublin Region, and participation in the suppression of the Warsaw uprising in 1944.<sup>104</sup>

## Conclusion

The issue of the political rehabilitation and glorification of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) became one of the central political issues in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan. It provoked major political and historical controversies and debates in Ukraine and other countries. Presidents Yushchenko and Poroshenko, their parties, far right organizations, and many Ukrainian historians attempted to recast the OUN-B and the UPA as parts of a popular national liberation movement that fought against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and to present the OUN-B and UPA leaders as national heroes. They denied, minimized or justified the involvement of the OUN-B and the UPA leaders and members in the mass murder of Jews, Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians.

The analyses of biographic publications, historical studies, and archival documents show that the majority of the OUN-B and UPA leaders and very large proportions of their members collaborated with Nazi Germany, mainly in the beginning of the Second World War. Nearly half of the top and middle-ranked leaders of these organizations and at least until the end of 1943 the majority of UPA members served in various police formations. They assisted the German occupation authorities in implementing genocidal policies towards the Jews, Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles by helping to carry out mass shootings and create conditions intended for the physical annihilation of the entire Jewish population and large numbers of Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles, specifically in Volhynia. The fact that many police commanders and large numbers of policemen in various locations and formations followed orders from the OUN-B by deserting *en masse* from their service, in particular in Volhynia in the spring of 1943, and forming the basis of the UPA shows that these commanders and police members were de facto controlled by the OUN-B.

This study suggests a need for further research of certain issues that remain insufficiently explored, including the specific extent of the presence of former policemen in the

UPA in Galicia and Bukovyna and the form of collaboration of many OUN-B and UPA leaders and members with the intelligence and security agencies of Nazi Germany. The involvement of OUN-B leaders and members, who organized and served in regional and local administrations, in the mass murders of Jews, Roma, Soviet POWs, and Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish civilians during the German occupation also requires further research.

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<sup>104</sup> See: Archive USBU in the Volyn Oblast, Sprava F-253; Klymenko/Tkachov, Ukraintsi; Sol Littman, *Pure Soldiers or Sinister Legion: the Ukrainian 14<sup>th</sup> Waffen-SS Division*, Montreal, 2003, 53-58; Marcin Majewski, *Przyczynek do wojennych dziejów Ukraińskiego Legionu Samoobrony (1943–1945)* [A contribution to the war history of the Ukrainian Self-Defense Legion (1943–1945)], in: *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość* 2 (2005) 8, 295-327.